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Dual universality of hash functions and its
applications to quantum cryptography
Toyohiro Tsurumaru and Masahito Hayashi
Abstract—In this paper, we introduce the concept of dual
universality of hash functions and present its applications to
quantum cryptography. We begin by establishing the one-to-
one correspondence between a linear function family F and a
code family C, and thereby defining ε-almost dual universal2
hash functions, as a generalization of the conventional universal2
hash functions. Then we show that this generalized (and thus
broader) class of hash functions is in fact sufficient for the
security of quantum cryptography. This result can be explained
in two different formalisms. First, by noting its relation to the
δ-biased family introduced by Dodis and Smith, we demonstrate
that Renner’s two-universal hashing lemma is generalized to our
class of hash functions. Next, we prove that the proof technique
by Shor and Preskill can be applied to quantum key distribution
(QKD) systems that use our generalized class of hash functions
for privacy amplification. While Shor-Preskill formalism requires
an implementer of a QKD system to explicitly construct a linear
code of the Calderbank-Shor-Steane type, this result removes the
existing difficulty of the construction a linear code of CSS code
by replacing it by the combination of an ordinary classical error
correcting code and our proposed hash function. We also show
that a similar result applies to the quantum wire-tap channel.
Finally we compare our results in the two formalisms and show
that, in typical QKD scenarios, the Shor-Preskill–type argument
gives better security bounds in terms of the trace distance and
Holevo information, than the method based on the δ-biased
family.
I. INTRODUCTION
Extracting secure uniform random number is an impor-
tant task for cryptographic applications with the presence
of quantum leaked information as well as that of classical
leaked information. For the quantum setting, several extractors
are proposed, e.g., 2-universal hashing [35], approximate 2-
universal hashing [40], sample-and-hash [28], one-bit extrac-
tors [27], and Trevisan’s extractor [1]. In this paper, we
focus on universal2 hash functions [5] which has a variety
of cryptographic applications, for example, for the informa-
tion theoretically secure signatures, the hash functions for
for privacy amplification [39], [3], [15] and for the wire-
tap channel[20], [21]. The class of universal2 hash function
families is the largest class of families of hash functions among
known classes of families of hash functions guaranteeing the
strong security. However, there might exist a larger class of
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hash functions guaranteeing the strong security. If such a class
exists, we might realize a strongly secure privacy amplification
with a smaller complexity. It is known that the class of
universal2 hash functions is included in the class of ε-almost
universal2 hash functions[5], [43]. However, as is shown in
Section VIII-B, there exists an example of ε-almost universal2
hash functions that cannot yield the strong security. Hence, we
have to consider another type of generalization of the class of
universal2 hash functions.
In this paper, in order to seek such a larger class, we restrict
our hash functions to linear functions on a finite-dimensional
space over the finite field F2 because a larger part of hash
functions with a smaller complexity are linear. Under the
restriction, we can find a one-to-one correspondence between
a hash function and a linear code by considering the kernel
of the hash function. Focusing on the dual code of the code
corresponding to the given hash function, we propose the
class of ε-almost dual universal2 hash functions as a class
of families of linear hash functions satisfying the following
conditions:
1) The class of families of hash functions contains the class
of universal2 hash functions.
2) Any family of hash functions in this class yields the
strong security when the generating key rate is suffi-
ciently small.
Hence, the relation among class of families of hash func-
tions is summarized as Fig. 1.
strongly secure hash functions
㱑-almost
universal2 hash functions
universal2
hash functions
㱑-almost dual
universal2 hash functions
permuted code family
given in Section IV
example given 
in Subsection VIII.B
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dual universal2
hash functions
Fig. 1. Relation among hash functions (when ε increases as a polynomial
of n). The modified Toeplitz matrices are given by a concatenation (X, I) of
the Toeplitz matrix X and the identity matrix I , mentioned in Section II.
This fact can be shown by two different approaches. In the
first approach, we focus on the concept of the δ-biased family,
2which was introduced by Dodis and Smith [9]. Their results
have also been extended to the quantum case ([10], or Lemma
2 of this paper). Since the main purpose of their original
results is to correct errors without leaking partial information,
they do not treat hash functions and privacy amplification. In
this paper, adding an appropriate discussion to their results
concerning the δ-biased family, we show the strong security
for the case where ε-almost dual universal2 hash functions are
applied in the privacy amplification with a sufficient sacrifice
bits. Since the bound (Lemma 3) derived by this approach has
a form similar to that by Renner [35], we need to apply the
method of smoothing [22]. We call this approach the δ-biased
approach.
In the second approach, we focus on the relation between
the phase error probability and the leaked information given
by the security proof [18], [17], [34] of a QKD protocol called
the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol [2]. The key point
of this approach is the error correction in the phase basis by
using a certain type of random coding. Hence we call this
approach the phase error correction approach.
While both approaches derive similar conclusions qualita-
tively, the security bounds are different even when the same
ε-almost dual universal2 hash functions are applied. In this re-
spect, the phase error correction approach has two advantages
over the δ-biased approach. As the first advantage, in the case
of the BB84 QKD protocol via a depolarizing channel, as is
shown in Section VII-C, the phase error correction approach
yields better bounds in terms of the trace distance and Holevo
information, than the δ-biased approach.
Next in order to explain the second advantage, we consider
the case where we apply the privacy amplification after the
error correction. In this setting, we treat a pair of two codes,
i.e., the larger code for the error correction, and the smaller
code for privacy amplification. Then the second advantage of
the phase error correction approach is that it can guarantee
the strong security with a larger class of families of code
pairs, than the δ-biased approach. In fact, in order to guarantee
the strong security in this setting, the δ-biased approach
requires ε-almost dual universal2 hash functions for a fixed
error correction code. However, in the phase error correction
approach, we can relax this requirement for the family of code
pairs. That is, this approach guarantees the strong security
with a larger class of families of code pairs. As a concrete
example of advantage of this concept, we note the construction
of an appropriate deterministic hash function for a given error
correction code, which needs the treatment of the security for
such a larger class of families of code pairs. That is, employing
the phase error correction approach, we can show the existence
of a deterministic hash function for a given error correction
code that is universally secure under the independent and
identical condition.
The organization of this paper is as follows. We begin
in Section II by reviewing the conventional universal hash
functions, i.e., the properties of ε-almost universal2 functions.
Then we restrict ourselves to linear hash functions over a finite
field Fn2 , and establish a one-to-one correspondence between
a linear hash function family F and a linear code family C,
by using the simple fact that a kernel of a linear function is
a linear space, and thus can be considered as a code. This
correspondence does not only allow us to define the code
family C of a given universal hash function family F , but
also the dual code family C⊥ corresponding to it. Under this
setting, interestingly, a simple algebraic argument shows that
the universality of C (i.e., the property of C being universal2)
also guarantees that of C⊥ (see Fig. 1). For example, (1) if
C is universal2, or equivalently, 1-almost universal2, then C⊥
is 2-almost universal2, but nevertheless, (2) for an ε-almost
universal2 code family C with ε > 1, the dual code family C
is not necessarily ε-almost universal2, as can be seen from an
explicit counterexample. These results lead us to introduce a
new class of hash functions called an ε-almost dual universal2
hash function family, as a set of hash functions whose kernels
form an ε-almost dual universal2 code family. This concept
is indeed a generalization of the conventional universality2,
since a universal2 hash function family is a special case of
our ε-almost dual universal2 family.
In Section III, we note a simple relation between our “ε-
almost dual universal2 family” and the concept of the “δ-
biased family”, originally introduced by Dodis and Smith [9]
for correcting errors without leaking partial information. By
using this relation, we demonstrate that Renner’s two-universal
hashing lemma [35, Lemma 5.4.3] can be extended to the
case where an ε-almost dual universal hash function family is
used. Note here that in Refs. [9], [10], they did not refer this
relation with privacy amplification. This result means that the
hashing lemma is valid for a broader class of hash functions
than previously thought, since the conventional type of two-
universal hash functions is a special case of our ε-almost dual
universal2 hash functions.
In Section IV, we introduce the concept of the permuted
code family, as the set of codes obtained by permuting bits
of a given code C. Then we show the existence of a code C,
whose permuted family CC is (n+1)-almost dual universal2,
with n being the bit length of C. The code C of this type
is particularly useful when the setting of our communication
model is invariant under bit permutations, since the average
performance of the code C equals that of an (n + 1)-almost
dual universal2 code family. Due to this property, the permuted
code family plays a key role in showing the existence of a
deterministic hash function that works universally for different
types of channels.
In Section V, as a preparation for later sections, we apply
the results of Sections II and IV to error correction. We show
that a code C ∈ C serves as a good code when it is chosen
randomly from an ε-almost universal2 code family C.
In Section VI, we apply these results to the security proof
of a QKD protocol called the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84)
protocol [2]. We use the proof technique of the Shor-Preskill–
type, which reduces the security of a secret key to the
error correcting property of the Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS)
quantum error correcting code (e.g., [37], [13], [41], [18]).
This proof technique is elegant and widely used, but also
has a drawback. That is, it requires the implementation of
the classical CSS code in actual QKD systems, which can be
difficult especially for large block lengths (This is not the case
for Renner’s method, where universal2 hash functions can be
3used for privacy amplification). Our result solves this diffi-
culty; even when one uses ε-almost dual universal2 functions
for privacy amplification, the security can be shown in the
Shor-Preskill formalism. Note here again that the conventional
universal2 function family is a special case of our ε-almost
dual universal2 families.
Then, in Section VII, we apply our results on QKD to the
quantum wire-tap channel. In this model, a sender Alice has
channels to two receivers, i.e., an authorized receiver Bob,
and an unauthorized receiver Eve, often referred to as a wire-
tapper. The channels from Alice to Bob and to Eve are not
necessarily restricted to any type, but we assume that they
are both specified when we analyze the security. The main
issue here is to obtain an upper bound of leaked information
with with appropriate transmission rates. The net transmission
rate can be given as the information transmission rate R′ to
Bob minus the sacrifice bit rate R. The former rate can be
treated in the framework of error correcting code. The latter
rate corresponds to a privacy amplification process.
Under these settings, in Section VII, we consider a specific
type of the quantum wire-tap channel where Alice and Bob
are connected by the Pauli channnel. By applying our results
on QKD to this model, we show that an ε-almost dual
universal2 function family is sufficient for removing Eve’s
information. Then by using the invariance of the channel
under bit permutations, we also show the existence of a
deterministic hash function that works universally, that is, the
hash function whose construction does not depend on the
phase error probability caused by the wire-tapper. We also
clarify that our evaluation is better than the δ-biased approach
based on given [9], [10], [22].
Finally, in Section VIII, we discuss the relation with existing
results. In Subsection VIII-A, we summarize the relation with
existing results. In Subsection VIII-B, we provide an example
of an ε-almost universal2 hash function family that yields
insecure bits. In Section VIII-C, we consider the case where
one applies the privacy amplification after the error correction.
Then, we show that the phase error correction approach can
guarantee the strong security with a larger class of families of
code pairs than the δ-biased approach.
II. DUAL UNIVERSALITY OF A CODE FAMILY
A. Linear universal hash functions as a linear code family
We start by reviewing the basic properties of universal2 hash
functions. Consider sets A and B, and also a function family
F consisting of functions from A to B; that is, F is a set of
function F = {fr|r ∈ I} with fr : A→ B, where I denotes
a set of indices r of hash functions. Our purpose is to select
fr with an equal probability and use them as a hash function,
and for this purpose, we always let |A| ≥ |B| ≥ 2. We say
that a function family F is ε-almost universal2 [5], [43], if,
for any pair of different inputs x1,x2, the collision probability
of their outputs is upper bounded as
Pr [fr(x1) = fr(x2)]
=
1
|I|# { r ∈ I | fr(x1) = fr(x2) } ≤
ε
|B| . (1)
The parameter ε appearing in (1) is shown to be confined in
the region
ε ≥ |A| − |B||A| − 1 , (2)
and in particular, a function family F attaining the equality
of (2) is called an optimally universal2 function family [38].
On the other hand, a family F with ε = 1 is simply called a
universal2 function family.
There are three important examples of universal2 hash
function families:
• Example 1: Toeplitz matrices (see, e.g., [29]). Let
{Mr | r ∈ I} be a set of all m × n Toeplitz matrices.
Then for an input x ∈ Fn2 , the output y ∈ Fm2 of function
fr is given by y = xMr.
• Example 2: Modified Toeplitz matrices (see, e.g., [20]).
Let T = {Tr | r ∈ I} be a set of all m×(n−m) Toeplitz
matrix. Then let Mr = (Tr, Im) be an m × n matrix
defined by a concatenation of Tr and the m-dimensional
identity matrix Im. For an input x ∈ Fn2 , the output y ∈
F
m
2 of function fr is given by y = xMr.
These (modified) Toeplitz matrices are particularly useful
in practice, because there exists an efficient multiplication
algorithm using the fast Fourier transform algorithm with
complexity O(n log n) (see, e.g., [12]).
In this paper, we focus only on linear functions over a finite
field F2. We assume that sets A,B are Fn2 , Fm2 respectively
with n ≥ m, and fr are linear functions over F2. Note that,
in this case, there is a kernel Cr corresponding to each fr,
which is a vector space of n −m dimensions or more. Also
note that, conversely, when given a vector subspace Cr ⊂ Fn2
of n − m dimensions or more, one can always construct a
linear function
f˜r : F
n
2 → Fn2/Cr ∼= Flr2 with maxr lr = m. (3)
This means that, by considering Cr as an error-correcting
code1, we can always identify a linear hash function fr and a
error correcting code Cr.2
In this terminology, since n − minr dimCr = m, the
definition of ε-universal2 function family of (1) takes the form
∀x ∈ Fn2 \ {0}, Pr
[
f˜r(x) = 0
]
≤ 2−mε, (4)
which can further be rewritten as
∀x ∈ Fn2 \ {0}, Pr [x ∈ Cr] ≤ 2minr dimCr−nε. (5)
This shows that the set of kernel C = {Cr|r ∈ I} contains
sufficient information for determining if a function family F =
{fr|r ∈ I} is ε-almost universal2 or not.
To see this in more detail, we give explicit constructions.
For later convenience, we denote a generating matrix of a code
C by G(C), so that the rows of G(C) are basis vectors of C.
1For the present, we take a standpoint that any vector subspace of Fn
2
is a
code, whether or not it can actually correct errors.
2Note that dimCr = dimKer fr = n − lr is not a constant in general.
For example, for the function family defined by multiplication of all normal
(i.e., unmodified) Toeplitz matrices of Example 1, dimCr varies from n−m
to n depending on r ∈ I . The special case of dimCr being a constant will
be discussed in detail in Section II-C.
4We also denote a parity check matrix of C by H(C), hence
one may choose H(C) = G(C⊥). If one wants to construct
Cr from fr, let x be a column vector, and define a linear
function fr as y = fr(x) = Mrx by using an m × n-matrix
Mr. Here Mr corresponds to a parity check matrix of error-
correcting code Cr , and thus the row vectors of Mr spans
C⊥r . Conversely, if one wants to construct a linear function
f˜r : F
n
2 → Fm2 from a code Cr, do as follows: First, let lr :=
dimC⊥r ≤ m, and take a basis of C⊥r ⊂ Fn2 as {u1, . . . , ulr},
and a basis of Fm2 as {v1, . . . , vm}. Then define a matrix M˜r =∑lr
i=1 viu
T
i , and let f˜r(x) = M˜rx.
It should be noted that, in fact, this construction of f˜r has an
ambiguity that comes from choices of bases {ui} and {vi}. By
the above procedure, even when one constructs Cr from fr,
and then f˜r from the obtained Cr, f˜r and fr may not equal
in general. In this paper, however, we do not worry about
this ambiguity, because (i) the ambiguity does not affect the
property of f˜r being ε-almost universal2, and (ii) the ambiguity
is absent after all when we actually implement and operate
universal hash functions for cryptographic purposes; in such
cases, we never think of Cr as a vector space, but rather
specify matrices Mr or basis sets of Cr explicitly. Note that a
similar situation happens with error-correcting codes as well;
i.e., it is convenient to interpret Cr as a mathematical vector
space when one analyzes the code theoretically, but in practice
one can never implement a code as a program or a circuit
without specifying the basis vectors, or equivalently, the parity
check and the generating matrices.
B. Dual universality of a code family
From these arguments, we define the universality of error-
correcting codes as follows.
Definition 1: We define the minimum (respectively, max-
imum) dimension of a code family C = {Cr|r ∈ I} as
tmin := minr∈I dimCr = minr∈I n − lr (respectively,
tmax := maxr∈I dimCr = maxr∈I n− lr).
Definition 2: We define the dual code family C⊥ of a given
linear code family C = {Cr|r ∈ I} as the set of all dual codes
of Cr. That is, C⊥ = {C⊥r |r ∈ I}.
Definition 3: We say that a linear code family C = {Cr ⊂
F
n
2 | r ∈ I } of minimum dimension tmin is an ε-almost
universal2 code family of minimum dimension tmin , if the
following condition is satisfied
∀x ∈ Fn2 \ {0}, Pr [x ∈ Cr] ≤ 2tmin−nε. (6)
Relaxing Condition 6, we say that a linear code family C =
{Cr ⊂ Fn2 | r ∈ I } of maximum dimension tmax is an ε-
almost universal2 code family of maximum dimension tmin ,
if the following condition is satisfied
∀x ∈ Fn2 \ {0}, Pr [x ∈ Cr ] ≤ 2tmax−nε. (7)
As in the case of a universal2 function family, ε is bounded
from below by (2) as ε ≥ (2n− 2n−t)/(2n− 1). For the case
where ε achieves this minimum, we say that C is optimally
universal2. Similarly, if ε = 1, we call C a universal2 code
family.
We also introduce the notion of dual universality as follows.
Definition 4: We say that a code family C is ε-almost dual
universal2 of maximum (minimum) dimension t , if the dual
family C⊥ is ε-almost universal2 of minimum (maximum)
dimension t.
Hence, accordingly,
Definition 5: A linear function family F = {fr|r ∈ I} is
ε-almost dual universal2, if the kernels Cr of fr form an ε-
almost dual universal2 code family.
An explicit example of a dual universal2 function family
(with ε = 1) can be given by the modified Toeplitz matrices
(Example 2) mentioned earlier [18], i.e., a concatenation
(X, I) of the Toeplitz matrix X and the identity matrix I . This
example is particularly useful in practice because it is both
universal2 and dual universal2 (c.f., Fig. 1), and also because
there exists an efficient algorithm with complexity O(n log n).
Indeed, since Condition (6) coincides with (5), it seems it is
enough to use only Condition (6). In the case of Example 1,
a large part of Kernels of Mr takes their dimension to be the
maximum dimension n−m of the code family. Then, Kernels
of Mr forms an ε-almost universal2 code family of maximum
dimension n−m with ε = 1.
However, when we consider ε-almost dual universal2 family
of hash functions, our situation becomes more complex. In the
case of Example 1, a large part of dual codes of Kernels of
Mr takes their dimension to be the minimum dimension m
of the code family. In this case, the vector x belongs to the
dual code of Kernel of Mr if and only if x can be written
as a linear combination of row vectors of Mr. Hence, we can
show that
Pr[x ∈ (KerMr)⊥] ≤ 2m−n,
which implies that {Mr|r ∈ I} is an ε-almost 2 dual universal2
code family function family with ε = 1. Hence, Condition (7)
is essential for ε-almost dual universality2.
With these preliminaries, we can present the following main
theorem of this section:
Theorem 1: Given an ε-almost universal2 code family C
of minimum dimension t, the dual code family C⊥ is a
2(1− 2t−nε) + (ε− 1)2t-almost universal2 code family with
maximum dimension n − t. That is, for ∀x ∈ Fn2 \ {0}, the
dual code family C⊥ satisfies
Pr
[
x ∈ C⊥r
] ≤ (1− 2t−nε)2−t+1 + ε− 1. (8)
In other words, the code family C is also 2(1− 2t−nε)+ (ε−
1)2t-almost dual universal2.
Proof: For x, y ∈ Fn2 , let
px := Pr
[
x ∈ C⊥r
]
, (9)
Vx := {y ∈ Fn2 |(x, y) = 0} = {x, 0}⊥, (10)
where (x, y) denotes the inner product of x, y. Since #(Vx \
{0}) = 2n−1 − 1,
2t−nε(2n−1 − 1) =
∑
y∈Vx\{0}
2t−nε
≥
∑
y∈Vx\{0}
Pr [y ∈ Cr] . (11)
5Now, (i) If x ∈ C⊥r , it means that Cr ⊂ Vx, and we have
dim(Cr ∩ Vx) = dimCr ≥ t. Hence it follows that #(Cr ∩
Vx \ {0}) = #(Cr \ {0}) ≥ 2t − 1. On the other hand, (ii) If
x /∈ C⊥r , we have dim(Cr∩Vx) ≥ t−1, and thus #(Cr∩Vx \
{0}) ≥ 2t−1 − 1. Because ∑y∈Vx\{0} Pr [y ∈ Cr ] is equal to
the average of the number of #(Cr ∩ Vx \ {0}), relations (i)
and (ii) yields∑
y∈Vx\{0}
Pr [y ∈ Cr] ≥px(2t − 1) + (1 − px)(2t−1 − 1)
=2t−1 + px2
t−1 − 1. (12)
Combining (11) and (12), we have 2t−n(2n−1−1)ε ≥ 2t−1+
px2
t−1 − 1, which leads to inequality (8).
Theorem 2: Inequality (8) of Theorem 1 is tight. That is, for
an integer t ≤ n, an element x ∈ Fn2 \ {0}, and a positive real
number ε ≤ 2−21−t1−21−n , there exists an ε-almost universal2 code
family C with minimum dimension t satisfying the equality of
(8).
In the above theorem, the real number ε = 2−2
1−t
1−21−n is the
maximum number satisfying (1 − 2t−nε)2−t+1 + ε− 1 ≤ 1.
Proof: Fix x ∈ Fn2 . Then define a code family A =
{Ar} in Fn2 as follows. Choose randomly an t-dimensional
subspace of Vx = {y ∈ Fn2 |(x, y) = 0}. That is, select t
linearly independent elements from Vx randomly, and let them
span a subspace Ar. Then one has:
y ∈ Vx \ {0}, Pr [y ∈ Ar] = 2
t − 1
2n−1 − 1 . (13)
We also define another code family B = {Br} as follows.
First choose a t − 1-dimensional subspace of Vx randomly,
and then include an additional basis element z 6∈ Vx to it, so
that they form an t-dimensional subspace in total. Then the
following inequalities hold:
y ∈ Vx \ {0}, Pr [y ∈ Br] = 2
t−1 − 1
2n−1 − 1 , (14)
y 6∈ Vx, Pr [y ∈ Br] = 2t−n. (15)
Finally, define a code family C = {Cr} by combining A
with probability p, and B with probability 1 − p, where p is
defined by
p :=
(
1− 2t−nε) 2−t+1 + ε− 1. (16)
One may wonder that this construction using probability p
deviates from our definition of universal2 code family that
each element Cr is chosen with the uniform probability. One
way to cure this problem is to include multiple copies of A and
B in C. For example, if p = a/b with a, b ∈ N, then construct
C as a combination of a copies of A and b− a copies of B.
From (13), (14), and (15), it is straightforward to see that
C is ε-almost universal2. Also note, since x ∈ C⊥r holds only
when A is chosen, we have
Pr
[
x ∈ C⊥r
]
= p. (17)
Hence, C indeed attains the equality of (8).
We give some useful examples of Theorems 1 and 2. We
apply these results to several communication models in later
sections.
Corollary 1: The following relations hold for a code family
C and the dual family C⊥:
1) If C is optimally universal2, C⊥ is also optimally
universal2. In other words, an optimally universal2 fam-
ily C is also optimally dual universal2.
2) If C is universal2 (i.e., 1-almost universal2), C⊥ is 2-
almost universal2. In other words, a universal2 family C
is also 2-almost dual universal2.
3) For ε > 1, however, an ε-almost universal2 family C is
not necessarily ε′-almost dual universal2. That is, there
is an example of an ε-almost universal2 family C with
maxx Pr[x ∈ C⊥r ] = 1.
Proof: Items 1 and 2 are obvious. For item 3, choose ε
so that the right hand side of (8) equals 1.
C. Case of sujective linear function family
Some linear function families F = {fr : Fn2 → Fm2 | r ∈ I}
consist only of surjective functions fr, i.e., functions fr
satisfying Im fr = Fm2 for all r ∈ I . In this case, it is straight-
forward to show that the dimension of the corresponding code
family C = {Cr | r ∈ I} is constant: dimCr = dim Ker fr =
n−m.
The goal of this subsection is to demonstrate that, for
these particular families, the definitions and the theorems of
the previous section concerning dual universal2 functions can
be greatly simplified. We take this particular case, because
we believe that it provides an intuitive picture on results of
the previous subsections; e.g., the dual universality can be
discussed directly without mentioning the corresponding code
family C. However, at the same time, it should also be noted
that there are many useful examples of non-surjective hash
function families including Toeplitz matrices of Example 1.
Hence in the rest of paper, we do not restrict ourselves to
surjective function family; instead we consider general linear
hash functions as defined in the previous subsection.
We begin by defining duality of surjective function families:
Definition 6: Given two surjective linear functions f :
F
n
2 → Fm2 and g : Fn2 → Fn−m2 , we say that f and g
are dual functions if Ker f = (Ker g)⊥, or equivalently, if
Ker g = (Ker f)⊥.
We note that a similar definition can be found in Ref. [34]. It
is straightforward to generalize this notion to function families:
Definition 7: Given two function families consisting only
of surjective functions and having the same index r ∈ I ,
F = {fr : Fn2 → Fm2 | r ∈ I},
G = {gr : Fn2 → Fn−m2 | r ∈ I},
we say that F and G are dual families, if fr and gr are dual
functions for all r ∈ I .
Recall from Definition 5 that a function family F is ε-
almost dual universal2 iff the corresponding code family C =
{C⊥r | r ∈ I} = {(Ker fr)⊥ | r ∈ I} is ε-almost universal2.
For a dual pair of surjective families F and G, this is equivalent
to the condition that C⊥ = {Ker gr|r ∈ I} is ε-almost
universal2. Then by noting the definition of universality2 given
6in (5), we can redefine the universality of surjective families
in a simpler way:
Definition 8: A surjective function family F is ε-almost
universal2, iff its dual function family G is ε-almost universal2.
Theorem 1 can also be simplified as:
Corollary 2: If a surjective function family F = {fr :
F
n
2 → Fm2 | r ∈ I} is ε-almost universal2, then its dual
function family G = {gr : Fn2 → Fn−m2 | r ∈ I} is
2(1− 2−mε) + (ε− 1)2n−m-almost universal2
It is convenient to consider these statements in terms of
matrices. Take an arbitrary pair of surjective linear functions,
f : Fn2 → Fm2 and gr : Fn2 → Fn−m2 . Then f can be written as
a matrix multiplication y = xM , with input x and output y,
and with M being an m× n matrix. Similarly, g can also be
expressed as y = xN with an (n −m)× n matrix N . Since
the row vectors of M , N form a basis of (Ker f)⊥, (Ker g)⊥,
respectively, we conclude that f and g are dual functions iff
MNT = 0.
Hence, a straightforward way of constructing a pair F , G
of dual family is as follows: First choose a code family C =
{C⊥r | r ∈ I} of a fixed dimension. Then define functions fr
by y = xG(Cr) with G(Cr) being the generating matrix of
Cr, and gr by y = xH(Cr) with H(Cr) being the parity
check matrix. In this case, if F is ε-universal2, then one can
guarantee that G is ε′-universal2, with ε and ε′ related as in
Theorem 1.
One useful example that fits this construction is the family
of all modified Toeplitz matrices, given as Example 2. In this
case, the presence of the identity matrix Im maximizes rank
Mr and guarantees the surjectivity of the corresponding linear
function. It is easy to see that the dual families are defined by
Nr = (In−m, T
T
r ), which is another class of modified Toeplitz
matrices (note MrNTr = 0).
Still, it should also be noted that there are many useful
examples of non-surjective hash function family. For example,
for the normal Toeplitz matrices of Example 1, the rank of
Tr ranges from zero to m depending on r (consider the case
where its rows are periodic). Hence in the rest of this paper, we
do not restrict ourselves to surjective function family; instead
we consider general linear hash functions as defined in the
previous subsection.
D. Generalization to subcode, extended code, and code pair
families
For the application to quantum key distribution, it is conve-
nient to generalize the concept of a universal2 code family to
those C = {C2,r} consisting solely of extended codes of C1.
Definition 9: Let C1 ⊂ Fn2 be a fixed m-dimensional code.
A code family C2 = {C2,r | r ∈ I} is called an extended
code family of C1, if each C2,r is an extended code of C1,
i.e., ∀r ∈ I, C1 ⊂ C2,r. An extended code family C of C1
is called an ε-almost universal2 extended code family of C1
with minimum (or maximum) dimension t, if
∀x ∈ Fn2 \ C1, Pr [x ∈ C2,r] = Pr [[x] ⊂ C2,r] ≤ 2t−nε,
where [x] denotes the coset with the representative x in Fn2/C1.
By considering a universality of a dual code family of such
extended code family, we are naturally led to the following
definition of universal2 subcode families.
Definition 10: Let C1 ⊂ Fn2 be a fixedm-dimensional code.
A code family C2 = {C2,r | r ∈ I} is called a subcode family
of C1, if each C2,r is a subcode of C1, i.e., ∀r ∈ I, C2,r ⊂ C1.
A subcode family C2 of C1 is called an ε-almost universal2
subcode family of C1 with minimum (or maximum) dimension
t, if
∀x ∈ C1 \ {0}, Pr [x ∈ C2,r] ≤ 2t−mε.
Definition 11: Let C1 ⊂ Fn2 be a fixedm-dimensional code.
A code family C2 = {C2,r | r ∈ I} is called a subcode family
of C1, if each C2,r is a subcode of C1, i.e., ∀r ∈ I, C2,r ⊂
C1. A subcode family C2 of C1 is called an ε-almost dual
universal2 subcode family of C1 with minimum (or maximum)
dimension t, if the extended code family C⊥ of C⊥1 is an ε-
almost universal2 extended code family of C⊥1 with maximum
(or minimum) dimension n − t. Similarly, an extended code
family C of C1 is called an ε-almost dual universal2 extended
code family of C1 with minimum (or maximum) dimension t,
if a subcode family C⊥2 of C⊥1 is called an ε-almost universal2
subcode family of C1 with maximum (or minimum) dimension
n− t.
One explicit construction of C2 is to first let D = {Dr ∈
F
m
2 |r ∈ I} be a universal2 code family with minimum
dimension t, and then define generating matrix of C2,r ∈ C2
by G(C2,r) := G(Dr)G(C1). For these types of codes as well,
we can prove a theorem similar to Theorems 1 and 2.
Theorem 3: Let C1 ⊂ Fn2 be a fixed m-dimensional code,
and C2 be an ε-almost universal2 subcode family C2 of C1
with minimum dimension t ≤ m. Then the dual code family
C⊥2 is a 2(1− 2t−mε) + (ε− 1)2t-almost universal2 extended
code (subcode) family of C⊥1 with maximum dimension n−t.
That is,
∀x ∈ F2 \ C⊥1 , Pr
[
x ∈ C⊥2,r
] ≤ (1− 2t−mε)2−t+1 + ε− 1.
(18)
In other words, the subcode family C2 is also a 2(1−2t−mε)+
(ε−1)2t -almost dual universal2 extended code family of C1.
Moreover, for an integer t ≤ m, an element x ∈ F2 \ C⊥1 ,
and a positive real number ε ≤ 2−21−t1−21−m , there exists an ε-
almost universal2 subcode family C2 of C1 with minimum
dimension t satisfying the equality of (18).
Proof: For an ε-almost universal2 subcode (extended
code) family C2 of C1, the equivalence relations C1 ∼=
F
n
2/C
⊥
1
∼= Fm2 hold. The proofs of the above theorems with
F
m
2 can be applied to this theorem.
Theorem 4: Let C1 ⊂ Fn2 be a fixed m-dimensional code,
and C2 be an ε-almost universal2 extended code family C2
of C1 with minimum dimension t ≥ m. Then the dual code
family C⊥2 is a 2(1− 2t−nε) + (ε− 1)2t−m-almost universal2
subcode family of C⊥1 with maximum dimension n− t. That
is,
Pr
[
x ∈ C⊥2,r
] ≤ (1− 2t−nε)2−t+m+1 + ε− 1 (19)
for ∀x ∈ C⊥1 \ {0}. In other words, the extended code family
C2 is also a 2(1−2t−nε)+(ε−1)2t−m -almost dual universal2
subcode family of C1.
7Furthermore, for an integer m ≤ t ≤ n, an element x ∈
C⊥1 \ {0}, and a positive real number ε ≤ 2−2
1−t+m
1−21−n+m , there
exists an ε-almost universal2 extended code family C2 of C1
with minimum dimension t satisfying the equality of (19).
Proof: Similarly, for an ε-almost universal2 extended
code family C2 of C1, the equivalence relations Fn2/C1 ∼=
C⊥1
∼= Fn−m2 hold. Under this equivalence, C2,r/C1 can be
regarded as subspace of Fn−m2 with the minimum dimension
t−m. The proofs of the above theorems with Fn−m2 and the
minimum dimension t−m can be applied to this theorem.
Furthermore, when the code C1 is randomly chosen, the
concept of an extended code family {C2,r}r can be gen-
eralized to the following way. In this case, we define the
property “ε-almost universal2” for a family of a pair of codes
{C1,r ⊂ C2,r}r.
Definition 12: A family of a pair of codes {C1,r ⊂ C2,r}r
is called an ε-almost universal2 code pair family with mini-
mum (or maximum) dimension t when it satisfies the condition
t = min
r
dimC2,r(max
r
dimC2,r)
∀x ∈ Fn2 \ {0}, Pr [x ∈ C2,r \ C1,r] ≤ 2t−nε.
Since any ε-almost universal2 extended code family {C2,r}r
of the code C1 gives an ε-almost universal2 code pair family
{C1 ⊂ C2,r}r, the concept “ε-almost universal2 code pair
family” is generalization of “ε-almost universal2 extended
code family”.
Considering the dual codes, we obtain the following defini-
tion.
Definition 13: a family of a pair of codes {C1,r ⊂ C2,r}r is
called an ε-almost dual universal2 pair family with maximum
(or minimum) dimension t if a family of a pair of codes
{C⊥2,r ⊂ C⊥1,r}r is an ε-almost universal2 code pair family
with minimum (or maximum) dimension n− t.
Since any ε-almost dual universal2 subcode family {C2,r}r of
the code C1 gives an ε-almost dual universal2 code pair family
{C2,r ⊂ C1}r, the concept “ε-almost dual universal2 code pair
family” is generalization of “ε-almost dual universal2 subcode
family”.
III. THE δ-BIASED FAMILY
Next, according to Dodis and Smith[9], we introduce δ-
biased family of random variables {Wr}. For a given δ > 0,
a family of random variables {Wr} on Fn2 is called δ-biased
when the inequality
Er(EWr (−1)x·Wr)2 ≤ δ2 (20)
holds for any x ∈ Fn2 , x 6= 0.
We denote the random variable subject to the uniform
distribution on a code C ∈ Fn2 by WC . Then,
EWC (−1)x·WC =
{
0 if x /∈ C⊥
1 if x ∈ C⊥. (21)
Using this relation, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 1: When a code family C = {Cr ⊂ Fn2}r with
minimum dimension n − m is ε-almost dual universal, the
family of random variables {WCr} on Fn2 is
√
ε2−m-biased.
Hence an ε-almost dual universal2 code family yields a
δ-biased family. For a partially eavesdropped random viable
A and a δ-biased family of random variables {Wr}r that is
independent from Eve’s random variable, Dodis and Smith [9]
proposed the protocol
(A,Wr) 7→ A+Wr (22)
for error correction with leaking partial information. In order
to evaluate the leaked information of this protocol, they
showed the classical version of the following lemma (Lemma
2). Fehr and Schaffner [10] extended it to the quantum case in
order to discuss the property of the protocol against a quantum
attacker.
In this section, with the help of Lemmas 1 and 2, we
evaluate the leaked information after the privacy amplification
by an ε-almost dual universal2 code family.
Given a classical-quantum state ρA,E =
∑
a P
A(a)|a〉〈a|⊗
ρEa on HA ⊗HE , and a normalized state σE on HE , Renner
[35] defines
d1(A : E|ρA,E) := ‖ρA,E − ρAmix ⊗ ρE‖1, (23)
and
d2(A : E|ρA,E‖σE)
:=2−H2(A|E|ρ
A,E‖σE) − 1|A|Tr ((σ
E)−1/4ρE(σE)−1/4)2
H2(A|E|ρA,E‖σE)
:=− log2 Tr ((I ⊗ σE)−1/4ρA,E(I ⊗ σE)−1/4)2
Hmin(A|E|ρA,E‖σE)
:=− log2 ‖(I ⊗ σE)−1/2ρA,E(I ⊗ σE)−1/2‖.
As relations among these quantities, Renner [35, Lemma 5.2.3]
shows
d1(A : E|ρA,E) ≤
√
|A|
√
d2(A : E|ρA,E‖σE) (24)
H2(A|E|ρ‖σ) ≥Hmin(A|E|ρ‖σ) (25)
For a distribution PW on A, we define another classical-
quantum state ρA,E ∗ PW := ∑w PW (w)∑a PA(a)|a +
w〉〈a+w|⊗ρEa , which describes the output state of the protocol
(22). Then, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 2 ([10, Theorem 3.2]): For any c-q sub-state ρA,E
on HA ⊗HE and any state σE on HE , a δ-biased family of
random variables {Wr} on A satisfies
Erd2(A : E|ρA,E ∗ PWr‖σE) ≤ δ22−H2(A|E|ρ
A,E‖σE).
(26)
Based on the above lemma, we can evaluate the average
performance of the privacy amplification by ε-almost dual
universal2 code family as follows.
Lemma 3: Given a classical-quantum state ρA,E on HA ⊗
HE and a state σE on HE . When {Cr} is a ε-almost dual
universal2 code family with minimum dimensionm, the family
of hash functions {fCr}r satisfies
Erd2(fCr(A) : E|ρA,E‖σE) ≤ ε2−H2(A|E|ρ
A,E‖σE). (27)
That is, any ε-almost dual universal2 hash function family
{fr}r satisfies the above inequality.
8Using (24) and (25), we obtain
Erd1(fCr(A) : E|ρA,E) ≤ε2
n−m
2
− 1
2
H2(A|E|ρ
A,E‖σE)
≤ε2n−m2 − 12Hmin(A|E|ρA,E‖σE).
(28)
Thus we have obtained the ε-almost dual universal version
of Theorem 5.5.1 of Renner [35]. Hence, the two-universal
hashing lemma and other results as given in Renner [35] can
be generalized to our ε-almost dual universal hash functions.
Note here that, as we have shown in Section II, the conven-
tional universal2 function family is a special case of our ε-
almost dual universal2 families. In the following, in order to
distinguish the method given in Sections VI and VII, we call
this approach to the privacy amplification by ε-almost dual
universal2 code family, the δ-biased approach.
Proof: Due to Lemma 2, we obtain
Erd2(A : E|ρA,E ∗ PWCr ‖σE) ≤ ε2−m2−H2(A|E|ρ‖σ).
(29)
Now, we focus on the relation A ∼= A/C×C ∼= fC×C for
any code C. That is, any a ∈ A can be uniquely specified by a
coset element [a] = a+C and a codeword w ∈ C. We regard
[a] as the hash value f(a) of a. Then, for PW (w) = 2−m, we
obtain
ρA,E ∗ PW =
∑
w∈C
2−m
∑
a
PA(a)|a+ w〉A〈a+ w| ⊗ ρEa
=
∑
w∈C
2−m|w〉W 〈w| ⊗
∑
[a]∈A/C
PA([a])|[a]〉F 〈[a]| ⊗ ρE[a]
=
∑
w∈C
2−m|w〉W 〈w| ⊗ ρfC(A),E .
In the second and the third lines, we used a new set of
basis such that |a〉A = |w〉W ⊗ |[a]〉F . Probability PA([a])
denotes that of a coset element [a] occurring: PA([a]) :=∑
w∈C P
A(a + w), and similarly, ρE[a] the mixed state cor-
responding to [a], i.e., ρE[a] :=
∑
w∈C ρ
E
a+w. Then by the
definition of d2, we have
d2(A : E|ρA,E ∗ PWC‖σE)
=2−md2(fC(A) : E|ρfC(A),E‖σE)
=2−md2(fC(A) : E|ρA,E‖σE).
Therefore, (29) implies
Er2
−md2(fCr(A) : E|ρA,E‖σE) ≤ ε2−m2−H2(A|E|ρ
A,E‖σE),
which implies (27).
Remark 1: One might think that the concept of “ε-almost
dual universal2 hash function family” is not needed because of
the correspondence between an ε-almost dual universal2 hash
function family and a δ-biased family given in Lemma 1. How-
ever, if we replace the terminology “ε-almost dual universal2
hash function family” by the terminology “δ-biased family”,
we make a serious confusion by the following reasons.
1) The concept of the “δ-biased family” is defined for a
family of random variables while the concept of the “ε-
almost dual universal2 hash function family” is defined
for a family of hash functions. It is confusing to use the
terminology “δ-biased family” for describing a family
of hash functions.
2) The correspondence holds only when a δ-biased family
is given as the uniform distribution on a code. Other
δ-biased families do not necessarily have such corre-
spondence.
3) If we study hash functions only in terms of the concept
of the δ-biased family, their relation with universal2 hash
functions family becomes obscure.
IV. PERMUTED CODE FAMILY
In some applications, our setting is invariant under permu-
tations of the order of bits in Fn2 . For example, in wire-tap
channels which we consider in later sections, independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) channels are assumed and thus
the protocol is invariant under permutations of bits. Then a
code C ⊂ Fn2 has the same performance as any bit-permuted
code of C.
In order to formulate such situations, we introduce the
permuted code family of a code C as a code family consisting
of bit-permuted codes of C
CC := {σ(C)|σ ∈ Sn}. (30)
Here Sn denotes the symmetric group of degree n, and σ(i) =
j means that σ ∈ Sn maps i to j, where i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The code σ(C) is the one obtained by permuting bits of C
by a permutation σ; if x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ C, then xσ :=
(xσ(1), . . . , xσ(n)) ∈ σ(C).
In what follows, we denote the distribution of the Hamming
weight k of codewords in C by PrC ; that is, the number of
codewords with weight k contained in C is |C|PrC(k). In
order to characterize the permuted code family CC , when the
dimension of a code C is t, we define
εk(C) :=
|C|PrC(k)
(nk)
2−t+n = 2
nPrC(k)
(nk)
(31)
ε(C) := max1≤k≤n εk(C). (32)
Lemma 4: The permuted code family CC is ε(C)-almost
universal2 code family.
Proof: Any code C′ ∈ CC has the weight distribution
PrC . By averaging them over all C′ ∈ CC , we see that code
family C also has the weight distribution PrC . That is, a code
C′ ∈ CC contains 2tPrC(k) elements of weight k on average.
On the other hand, the number of elements x ∈ Fn2 with
weight k is
(
n
k
)
, and due to the symmetry of CC under bit
permutations, each of them is contained in some C′ ∈ CC
with the same probability. Thus, an element x ∈ Fn2 with
weight k belongs to the code C′ ∈ CC with the probability
|C|PrC(k)
(nk)
. By taking the maximum with respect to k, we can
show that any element x ∈ Fn2 belongs to the code C′ ∈ CC
with the probability ε(C)2t−n. Hence, we obtain the desired
argument.
Theorem 5: For any 1 ≤ t ≤ n, there exists a t-dimensional
code C ∈ Fn2 such that ε(C) ≤ n+ 1.
Proof: Let C be a universal2 code family. Then,
Eεk(C) ≤ 1. The Markov inequality yields
Pr{εk(C) ≥ n+ 1} ≤ 1
n+ 1
, (33)
9and thus
Pr{ε1(C) < n+ 1, . . . , εn(C) < n+ 1}c
=Pr
⋃
1≤k≤n
{εk(C) ≥ n+ 1} ≤ n
n+ 1
.
Hence, there exists a code C such that
εk(C) < n+ 1 (34)
for k = 1, . . . , n.
Combining Lemma 4 and Theorem 5, we obtain the follow-
ing proposition.
Proposition 1: For any 1 ≤ t ≤ n, there exists a t-
dimensional code C such that the permuted code family CC
is n+ 1-almost universal2.
Indeed, Shulman et al. [36] discussed the average of de-
coding error probability under the permuted code family.
However, we do not consider the average of decoding error
probability, here. We show the relation with the concept of
ε-almost universal2 while they did not treat the relation with
the concept.
Similarly, we can define the permuted code pair family
for a given pair of codes C2 ⊂ C1 as the family of code
pairs CC2⊂C1 := {σ(C2) ⊂ σ(C1)|σ ∈ Sn}. We define
ε(C1/C2) := max1≤k≤n εk(C1) − εk(C2) |C2||C1| . As a gener-
alization of Lemma 4, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 5: The permuted code pair family CC1/C2 is
ε(C1/C2)-almost universal2 code pair family.
This lemma can be shown by the same discussion as the
proof of Lemma 5. Furthermore, we can show the following
theorem.
Theorem 6: For any t ≤ n and a code C2, there exists
a t-dimensional code C1 ∈ Fn2 such that C2 ⊂ C1 and
ε(C1/C2) ≤ n+ 1.
This theorem can be shown in the same way as Theorem 5 by
choosing the code C1 from a universal2 extended code family
of C2.
Combining Lemma 5 and Theorem 6, we obtain the follow-
ing proposition.
Proposition 2: For any 1 ≤ t ≤ n and a code C2, there
exists a t-dimensional extended code C1 of C2 such that the
permuted code pair family CC1/C2 is an n+1-almost universal2
code pair family.
Considering the dual codes, we obtain the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 3: For any 1 ≤ t ≤ n and a code C2,
there exists a t-dimensional subcode C1 of C2 such that the
permuted code pair family CC2/C1 is an n + 1-almost dual
universal2 code pair family.
Proposition 3 can be shown by substituting C⊥2 and C⊥1
into C2 and C1 in Proposition 2. In later sections, we use
these results for showing the existence of deterministic hash
function that work universally for quantum wire-tap channels.
V. APPLICATION TO ERROR CORRECTING CODES
In this section, as a preliminary for later section, we apply
the results of Section II to error correction. We use a code
C ∈ C chosen randomly from an ε-almost universal2 code
family C for error correction, and show that it indeed serves
as a good code. As previous work, for example, Brassard
and Salvail applied universal2 codes in the context of infor-
mation reconciliation (Ref. [4], Theorem 6). Muramatsu and
Miyake have also studied a similar problem using a somewhat
generalized definition of universal hash functions [33]. Here
we present a much simpler evaluation by employing a more
restrictive condition for the family of codes than [33].
We consider a noisy channel with the additive noise, and
denote the probability that the noise x ∈ Fn2 occurs by PX(x).
We also denote by PˆX(k) the probability that an error with the
Hamming weight k occurs. In this channel, the sender Alice
uses an ε-almost universal2 code family as error correcting
codes. The receiver Bob applies the maximum likelihood
decoder to his bits. In order to evaluate the performance of
the decoder, we focus on the decoding error probability, i.e.,
the probability that the decoder makes a wrong guess. We
denote this probability for a fixed code C by Pe(C). From
now on, we often treat a code C as a random variable that
is randomly chosen with the equal probability from the ε-
almost universal2 code family C. For example, we denote the
expectation of variable A with respect to the random variable
C as EC∈CA. In this notation, the main purpose of this section
is to evaluate EC∈CPe(C), i.e., the average of Pe(C) when C
is randomly chosen from C.
First, for the sake of simplicity, we evaluate performance
of the minimum Hamming distance decoder. Note that the
decoding error probability of this decoder, EC∈CPhd(C),
can be used as an upper bound on EC∈CPe(C), since the
maximum-likelihood decoder provides the minimum decod-
ing error probability Pe(C). We assume that our ε-almost
universal2 code family C has the maximum dimension tmax;
hence the decoder outputs tmax bits, and the code rate is
R = tmax/n. Now suppose that a bit flip x of Hamming
weight k occurs in the channel (i.e., an input w is mapped
to w + x). In this case, success and failure of the decode
by the minimum decoding is written by Phd(x,C). That
is, the success (the failure) is denoted by Phd(x,C) = 0
(Phd(x,C) = 1). Then the decoder fails if there exists another
code element y ∈ C with Hamming weight ≤ k; in other
words, if {y ∈ Fn2 : |y| ≤ k, y 6= x} ∩ (C \ {0}) 6= ∅. Then,
Phd(x,C) =1[{y ∈ Fn2 : |y| ≤ k, y 6= x} ∩ (C \ {0}) 6= ∅]
≤
∑
y:|y|≤k,y 6=x
1[y ∈ (C \ {0})], (35)
where 1[A] is the indicator function defined to be 1 when A
is valid and to be 0 otherwise. For a fixed element y, due to
Condition (7), any ε-almost universal2 code family C satisfies
EC∈C 1[y ∈ C] = Pr[y ∈ C] ≤ 2tmax−nε (36)
for y 6= 0. When averaged over C ∈ C, combining (35) and
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(36), we can evaluate the average probability of Phd(x,C)
EC∈CPhd(x,C) ≤ EC∈C
∑
y:|y|≤k,y 6=x
1[y ∈ (C \ {0})]
≤ EC∈C
∑
y:|y|≤k
1[y ∈ (C \ {0})]
= EC∈C
∑
y:|y|≤k,y 6=0
1[y ∈ C]
=
∑
y:|y|≤k,y 6=0
EC∈C 1[y ∈ C]
≤
∑
y:|y|≤k,y 6=0
2tmax−nε
≤ 2nh(min{k/n,1/2})2tmax−nε,
where the final inequality follows from the fact that∑k
i=0
(
n
i
) ≤ 2nh(min{k/n,1/2}) (see, e.g., Lemma 4.2.2 of
[24]). Also by noting the obvious bound EC∈CPhd(x;C) ≤ 1,
we have
EC∈CPhd(x;C) ≤ ε2−n[1−h(min{|x|/n,1/2})−R]+ (37)
for ε ≥ 1, where [a]+ := max{a, 0} for a ∈ R.
Since the behavior of the minimum Hamming distance
decoder is independent of parameter k, the bound (37) can
easily be generalized to the case in the following way where
a weight distribution PˆX(k) of errors is given.
EC∈CPe(C) = EC∈C
∑
x 6=0∈Fn2
PX(x)Phd(x;C)
=
∑
x 6=0∈Fn2
PX(x)EC∈CPhd(x;C)
≤ ε
∑
x 6=0∈Fn
2
PX(x)2−n[1−h(min{|x|/n,1/2})−R]+
= ε
n∑
k=1
PˆX(k)2−n[1−h(min{k/n,1/2})−R]+ . (38)
As to the asymptotic behavior, one can easily see that, when
the probability PˆX{k|1 − h (min{k/n, 1/2}) > R + δ}
approaches 1 for sufficiently small δ > 0, the right hand side
of (38) converges to zero. We note that Inequality (38) is used
in Ref. [23] to prove the security of the BB84 protocol for the
case of finite key lengths.
Remark 2: The essential point for the above evaluation for
EC∈CPe(C) is the exchange of the orders of
∑
x 6=0 and EC∈C.
For a fixed error x, the ε-almost universality2 guarantees the
evaluation of the average EC∈CPhd(x;C) as (37). If we fix a
code C, we cannot obtain a similar evaluation.
Next we consider the cases of finite n. In this case it
is not easy to calculate similar bounds, hence we further
assume that the channel is memoryless. That is, the probability
distribution PX of errors x is assumed to be the binary
distribution with probability p. In this channel, when p is
less than 1/2, the maximum-likelihood decoder is equivalent
to the minimum Hamming distance decoder. In this case, by
modifying Gallager’s bound for the random coding [11], we
can obtain the following simple bound.
Theorem 7: When PX(x) is given as the n-th independent
and identical distribution of the distribution (1−p, p), then the
average decoding error probability of error correction using an
ε-almost universal2 code family C with maximum dimension
tmax = nR satisfies
EC∈CPe(C) ≤ min
0≤s≤1
εs2−n[−sR+E0(s,p)], (39)
where
E0(s, p) := s− log2
[
p
1
1+s + (1− p) 11+s
]1+s
. (40)
This theorem is shown in Appendix A. The function
E0(s, p) defined in (40) is in fact the specialized form of
Gallager’s E0(s,p) for the binary symmetric channel and the
uniform input distribution [11]. Hence by using the method of
[11], the right hand side of (39) can be used to evaluate the
exponential decreasing rate of EC∈CPe(C) with respect to n
as follows.
Corollary 3: Under the same conditions as Theorem 7,
EC∈CPe(C) can be bounded from above as
EC∈CPe(C) ≤ 2−nE(R,p) max{ε, 1} (41)
where E(R, p) is Gallager’s reliability function
E(R, p) := max
0≤s≤1
−sR+ E0(s, p). (42)
In particular, E(R, p) is strictly positive for R < 1− h(p).
Proof of Corollary 3: The first half of the corollary is
obvious. Denote the argument of the maximum by ER(s, p) :=
−sR+ E0(s, p). Then ER(0, p) = 0, and ∂∂sER(s, p)
∣∣
s=0
=
1− h(p)−R > 0 if R < 1− h(p). Hence ER(s, p) attains its
positive maximum value at s ∈ (0, 1]. (Also see Ref. [11].)
The exponential decreasing rate E(R, p) of (41) can also
be verified from (38) by using the type method [8] when p ≤
1/2. For this purpose, we introduce the divergence function
d(q‖p) := q log qp+(1−q) log 1−q1−p . Since PˆX(k) ≤ 2−nd(q‖p)
with q = k/n for the binary symmetric channel [8] and∑n
k=⌈n/2⌉ Pˆ
X(k) ≤ 2−nd(1/2‖p), the right hand side of (38)
can be evaluated as
ε
n∑
k=0
PˆX(k)2−n[1−h(min{k/n,1/2})−R]+
≤ε(2−nd(1/2‖p)
+ ⌊n/2 + 1⌋ max
0≤k≤n/2
PˆX(k)2−n[1−h(k/n)−R]+)
≤⌊n/2 + 2⌋ε max
0≤q≤1/2
2−n([1−h(q)−R]++d(q‖p))
=⌊n/2 + 2⌋ε2−nmin0≤q≤1/2 [1−h(q)−R]++d(q‖p). (43)
One can see that the exponential decreasing rate of (43)
indeed equals E(R, p) by using the relation
min
0≤q≤1/2
[1− h(q)−R]+ + d(q‖p) = max
0≤s≤1/2
−sR+ E0(s, p).
(44)
The proof of this relation is given, e.g., in Csisza´r-Ko¨rner [8]
in a more general form. However, since a simpler proof of
(44) can be given by using the property of additive channels,
we reproduce it in Appendix B for readers’ convenience.
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Now, we consider the case where the sender and the receiver
use a fixed t-dimensional code C that satisfies the condition
of Theorem 5, i.e., a code C whose permuted code family CC
is (n + 1)-almost universal2. If the error distribution PX is
permutation invariant, e.g., if the channel is binary symmetric,
we have Pe(C) = Pe (σ(C)) for any permutation σ ∈ Sn,
which implies that Pe(C) = Eσ∈SnPe(σ(C)). In other words,
one may evaluate Pe(C) as if the code family CC were actually
used. Thus, by applying (39) and by noting n + 1 > 1, we
obtain the inequality
Pe(C) ≤ (n+ 1)2−nE(R,p) (45)
with R = t/n. Note that the code C satisfies this inequalities
for any p.
In the rest of this section, we show that the above results
also hold for the case where the information is encoded by
the coset C1/C2 of two given codes C1 and C2 satisfying
C2 ⊂ C1 ⊂ Fn2 . These codes are used for constructions of the
quantum Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes, and for this
reason, they are often called the classical CSS codes. In this
section, we restrict ourselves to the following type of classical
communication. A message to be sent is a coset [x] ∈ C1/C2,
and when the sender wants to send [x], she chooses an element
randomly from the set x+ C2 with the equal probability and
sends it. On the receiver’s side, Bob first applies the maximum
likelihood decoder of C1 on the received sequence and obtains
an element y ∈ C1. Then, he obtains a coset [y] ∈ C1/C2
as the final decoded message. We denote the decoding error
probability of this decoder by Pe(C1/C2).
We assume that the subcode C2 is fixed, and the larger
code C1 is randomly chosen with the equal probability
from the ε-almost universal2 extended code family C of C2
with maximum dimension tmax. Again, the purpose of the
following discussion is to evaluate EC1∈CPe(C1/C2). By a
similar argument as above, when the bit flip error occurs on k
bits in the noisy channel, we can show that EC1∈CPe(C1/C2)
is less than min{2nh(min{k/n,1/2})ε2tmax−n, 1} ≤
ε2−n[1−h(min{k/n,1/2})−R]+ , R = tmax/n for ε ≥ 1.
Thus, for any weight distribution PˆX of errors, we have
EC1∈CPe(C1/C2) ≤ ε
n∑
k=0
PˆX(k)2−n[1−h(min{k/n,1/2})−R]+ .
(46)
If we further assume the channel is memoryless, as a
generalization of Theorem 7 and Corollary 3, we have the
following.
Theorem 8: When PX(x) is given as the n-th independent
and identical distribution of the distribution (1 − p, p), then
an ε-almost universal2 extended code family C of C2 with the
maximum dimension tmax = nR satisfies
EC1∈CPe(C1/C2) ≤ min
0≤s≤1
εs2−n[−sR+E0(s,p)]. (47)
and thus
EC1∈CPe(C1/C2) ≤ 2−nE(R,p)max{ε, 1}. (48)
Further, the above inequalities are valid even with an ε-almost
universal2 extended code pair family {C1 ⊂ C2}.
This theorem is also shown in Appendix A in a way similar
to Theorem 7.
Finally, for a given code C2, we can choose another fixed
code C1 satisfying the condition of Theorem 6, i.e., C2 ⊂ C1
and ε(C1/C2) ≤ n + 1. We then assume that the sender
and the receiver use this fixed pair for error correction.
If the distribution PX is permutation invariant, we have
Pe(C1/C2) = Pe(σ(C1)/σ(C2)) for any permutation σ ∈ Sn,
which implies that Pe(C1/C2) = Eσ∈SnPe(σ(C1)/σ(C2)).
Thus one may evaluate Pe(C1/C2) as if the n + 1-almost
universal2 permuted extended code pair family CC2⊂C1 were
actually used. Applying (47), we obtain the inequality
Pe(C1/C2) ≤ (n+ 1)2−nE(R,p). (49)
Note that the code C1 satisfies this inequality for any p.
VI. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION
In this section, we show the strong security when an ε-
almost dual universal hash function family is applied in the
quantum key distribution (QKD). For this purpose, we apply
the results of previous sections to the phase error correction in
the security proof of quantum key distribution (QKD). Hence,
we call this approach the phase error correction approach.
In QKD, Alice and Bob need to perform a key distillation
protocol to generate a secret key from the sifted key that
they obtained as a result of the quantum communication. We
consider the following type of the BB84 protocol using a
function family F = {fr : Fm2 → Fl2|r ∈ I} for privacy
amplification.
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BB84 protocol using universal hash function family:
1) Alice and Bob establish sifted keys, and estimate
the bit error rate by the usual procedure of the
BB84 protocol, such as the one given in [37]. That
is,
a) Alice sends Bob qubit states chosen ran-
domly out of {|0z〉, |1z〉, |0x〉, |1x〉}.
b) Bob receives and measures them with ran-
domly chosen bases {z, x}.
c) By using the authenticated public channel,
Bob announces his measurement bases for
all qubits, and they keep only the bits for
which they chose the same basis.
d) They reveal randomly sampled bits over the
public channel, and calculate the estimated
bit error rate. If the rate is too high, they
abort the protocol.
As a result, Alice and Bob obtains sifted key
kA, kB ∈ Fn2 , respectively.
2) Alice picks a random number rA ∈ Fl2, and
announces v = kA ⊕ G(C1)rTA, with ⊕ denoting
XOR.
3) Bob calculates RB = kB ⊕ v and by correcting
its errors using C1, he obtains R′B ∈ C1. Then
he calculate raw bit rB ∈ Fl2 satisfying RB =
G(C1)r
T
B . (Thus rA = rB with high probability).
4) Alice selects a linear universal2 function fr :
F
m
2 → Fl2 randomly and announces it to Bob.
Then they calculate secret keys sA = fr(rA) and
sB = fr(rB).
By using the widely used proof technique due to Shor and
Preskill [37], [13], [41], [18], the unconditonal security of this
protocol has been shown for the case where F consists of the
completely random linear functions [41], [18]. On the other
hand, by using the quantum de Finneti representation theorem,
Renner proved the unconditional security of the BB84 protocol
using universal2 hash functions for privacy amplification [35].
In this section, we present a security proof of the Shor-
Preskill–type that holds with a weaker condition on F , i.e.,
with F being an ε-almost dual universal2 family. Note that
the condition on F is indeed relaxed, since, as shown in Sec.
II, the universal2 function family is a limited case of ε-almost
dual universal2 families.
Note also that our method has an extra advantage that,
unlike in [35], Alice and Bob do not need to perform random
permutations of the sifted key bits. Conversely, if the random
permutation is already implemented in one’s QKD system, or
if the channel is permutation invariant, our hash function can
be replaced by the one using the deterministic code obtained
in Theorem 6, since the permuted codes of this code pair form
an (n+ 1)-almost dual universal2 subcode pair family.
For showing the security, it is convenient to rewrite the
protocol in terms of the classical CSS code as follows.
BB84 protocol using code family C2:
1) Alice and Bob establish sifted keys kA, kB ∈ Fn2
by the same procedure as in the above protocol.
2) Alice picks RA ∈ C1 randomly and sends v =
kA ⊕RA to Bob over the public channel.
3) Bob calculates RB = v ⊕ kB , and by correcting
its errors using C1, he obtains R′B ∈ C1. (Thus
RA = R
′
B with high probability.)
4) Alice selects code C2,r randomly and announces
it to Bob. They both obtain secret keys as cosets
of C2,r, i.e., SA = RA +C2,r, SB = R′B +C2,r.
For the sake of simplicity, we will restrict ourselves to this
protocol for the rest of this section. We begin by reviewing
some of the known results and clarify notations. Assume that
the quantum channel between Alice and Bob is given by an
arbitrary quantum operation Λ, and thus the sifted key is
affected by Λ. As discussed in [17], [18], since the above
type of the BB84 protocol is invariant under twirling of qubits,
without loss of generality, one may consider the Pauli channel
Λt obtained by twirling the original channel Λ. The Pauli
channel Λt can generally be described by the joint probability
distribution PXZ of phase error and bit error (in this section,
we call an error in the x basis the phase error, and in the z
basis the bit error). That is, Λt transforms an n-qubit state ρ
to
Λt(ρ) =
∑
x,z∈Fn2
PXZ(x, z)ZxXzρ (ZxXz)
†
, (50)
where
Zx : = σx1z ⊗ · · · ⊗ σxnz ,
Xz : = σz1x ⊗ · · · ⊗ σznx
with σx and σz being the Pauli matrices, and x =
(x1, . . . , xn), z = (z1, . . . , zn) ∈ {0, 1}n. We denote
the marginal distribution of phase error by PX(x) =∑
z∈Fn2
PXZ(x, z). As in the previous section, PˆX(k) denotes
the distribution of the Hamming weight k of x obeying PX(x).
Next, before considering the secret key, we evaluate the
security of the sifted key v as an illustration. The result
here will also be used in later sections on wire-tap channels
and randomness extraction. Let ρA,E be Alice’s and Eve’s
total system when the when the first step of the protocol
(i.e., the quantum communication part) is finished. If one
employs the security criteria that takes into account the uni-
versal composability [35], the security of the sifted key can
be evaluated by Eve’s distinguishability ‖ρA,E − ρA ⊗ ρE‖1,
with ρA := TrEρA,E and ρE := TrAρA,E3. Alternatively,
one may evaluate the security by Eve’s Holevo information
χ := Tr ρA,E(log ρA,E−log ρA⊗ρE). These values are known
3 Recall that, in our protocol, Alice is assumed to choose her
sifted key uniformly. Hence ρA,E can generally be described as
ρA,E :=
∑
v1,...,vn
1
2n
|v1, . . . , vn〉〈v1, . . . , vn| ⊗ ρE(v1, . . . , vn),
where ρE(v1, . . . , vn) denotes Eve’s density matrix when Alice’s
sifted key is v = (v1, . . . , vn). In this case, TrEρA,E =∑
v1,...,vn
1
2n
|v1, . . . , vn〉〈v1, . . . , vn| gives the fully mixed state.
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to be bounded from above as [17], [18]
‖ρA,E − ρA ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ 2
√
2
√
Pph (51)
χ ≤ ηn(Pph), (52)
where Pph is the phase error probability of the channel Λt.
That is, Pph := 1− PX(x = 0n). The function ηn is defined
as
ηn(x) :=
{ −x log x− (1− x) log(1− x) + nx if x ≤ 1/2
1 + nx if x > 1/2.
(53)
Now we turn to the security of the secret key. The only
difference here is that the key is effectively sent through the
quantum channel that is error-corrected by the quantum CSS
code corresponding to the classical CSS code C1, C2. Hence
by using essentially the same argument as above, the security
can be evaluated by the phase error probability that remains
after the quantum error correction. When one sees it in the
phase basis (i.e., the x basis), this probability is given by the
decoding error probability of the classical CSS code C⊥2 /C⊥1 ,
which we denote by Pph
(
C⊥2 /C
⊥
1
)
. Then the security of the
secret key can be evaluated as [17], [18]
‖ρA,E − ρA ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ 2
√
2
√
Pph
(
C⊥2 /C
⊥
1
)
, (54)
χ ≤ ηl
(
Pph(C
⊥
2 /C
⊥
1 )
)
. (55)
The same evaluation as (54) has been done by Renes[34,
Theorem 5.1]. For the case of C1 = Fn2 , essentially the same
relation was noted by Koashi [26] and Miyadera [31].
Then we apply Theorem 8 to evaluate Pph
(
C⊥2 /C
⊥
1
)
. In our
BB84 protocol, the subcode C2 ⊂ C1 is randomly chosen from
an ε-almost dual universal subcode family C with minimum
dimension m− l of a fixed code C1. This corresponds to the
case where the dual code C⊥2 is chosen from the ε-almost
universal2 extended code family of the fixed code C⊥1 with
maximum dimension n−m+ l. Thus by applying inequality
(46), we have
EC2∈CPph
(
C⊥2 /C
⊥
1
) ≤ ε n∑
k=0
PˆX(k)2−n[S−h(min{k/n,1/2})]+ ,
(56)
where S = (m − l)/n is the sacrificed bit rate, i.e. the ratio
of bits reduced by privacy amplification. Therefore, from (51),
(52), and from the concavity of x 7→ √x, x 7→ ηl, we have
EC2∈C ‖ρA,E − ρA ⊗ ρE‖
≤2
√
2
√√√√ε n∑
k=0
PˆX(k)2−n[S−h(min{k/n,1/2})]+ , (57)
EC2∈C χ
≤ηl
(
ε
n∑
k=0
PˆX(k)2−n[S−h(min{k/n,1/2})]+
)
. (58)
In practical QKD systems, the weight distribution PˆX needs to
be estimated from the bit error rate of sampled bits (see, e.g.,
[17], [18]). If the phase error rate pph = k/n is estimated to be
less than a certain value pˆph with the exception of a negligiblly
small probability, and if S > h(pˆph), then the argument
ε2−n[S−h(min{k/n,1/2})]+ converges to zero for n → ∞.
Asymptotically, it is sufficient to sacrifice n [h (pˆph) + δ] bits
by privacy amplification with an arbitrary δ > 0.
From the above argument, we see that for the security of
QKD, it is sufficient to choose the code C2 from an ε-almost
dual universal2 subcode family of C1, while the existing
results (e.g., [35]) guarantee the security only when the code
C2 is randomly chosen from a universal2 subcode family of
C1. Since a universal2 subcode family of C1 is a 2-almost dual
universal2 subcode family of C1 (Theorem 4), our condition
is strictly weaker than that by [35].
It should also be noted that by setting C1 = Fn2 , our
argument also applies to Koashi’s proof technique [26]; that
is, random matrices appearing in Koashi’s protocol can be
replaced by an almost dual universal2 code family.
Further, the above discussion can be extended to an ε-almost
dual universal2 subcode pair family of {C2 ⊂ C1}. Now, we
choose m − l dimensional subcode C2 of C1 such that the
dual code C⊥2 satisfies the condition of Theorem 6. When the
Pauli channel is permutation invariant, this code satisfies (57)
and (58) with ε = n+ 1.
VII. QUANTUM WIRE-TAP CHANNEL
A. Evaluation by phase error correction approach
We apply our results of the previous section on QKD
for showing the security in the quantum wire-tap channel
model. In this model, the channel from Alice to Bob and the
channel from Alice to Eve are both specified. Particularly, in
this section, we assume that the channel from Alice to Bob
is given by the n-multiple use of the Pauli channel which
is described by the joint distribution PZX of bit error and
phase error on a single qubit system. We also assume that
phase error and bit error occur independently, and denote
the phase error probability by pph. This corresponds to a
limited case of the Pauli channel discussed in the previ-
ous section, i.e., PXnZn(x, z) =
∏n
i=1 P
X(xi)P
Z(zi) with
PX(1) = 1 − PX(0) = pph. As to the channel to Eve, we
assume that Eve can access all part of the environment system
corresponding to this channel.
Our goal is to show that Alice can send secret classical
information via the quantum channel to Bob by the following
coding protocol (c.f. the paragraph below (45)). First, Alice
chooses a classical CSS code C1, C2. A message to be sent is
a coset [x] ∈ C1/C2, and when the sender wants to send [x],
she chooses an element randomly from the set x + C2 with
the equal probability and sends it. On the receiver’s side, Bob
first applies the maximum likelihood decoder of C1 on the
received bit sequence and obtains an element y ∈ C1. Then,
he obtains a coset [y] ∈ C1/C2 as the final decoded message.
From Eve’s point of view, this protocol is equivalent to the
situation where Alice sends her classical information [x] ∈
C1/C2 by encoding it to a state |[x]〉 of the quantum CSS code
(see, e.g., [37]). Hence we can evaluate the security of [x] by
the same argument as the previous section, i.e., by inequality
(54) or by (55), depending on one’s security criteria. By noting
that the channel between Alice and Bob is i.i.d., we can apply
a simple bound given in Theorem 8. Thus, if a fixed a code
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C1, and an ε-almost dual universal2 subcode family of C of
C1 are used, the average of Pph
(
C⊥2 /C
⊥
1
)
satisfies
EC2∈CPph
(
C⊥2 /C
⊥
1
) ≤ 2−nE(1−S,pph) max{ε, 1}. (59)
Here tmin = n(1− S) is the minimum dimension of C2, and
tmax = nS is the maximum dimension of C⊥2 , which equals
the sacrificed bit length. As one can see from Corollary 3, the
exponential decreasing rate E (1− S, pph) on the right hand
side of (59) is strictly positive for S > h(pph). By using (59),
the averages of Eve’s distingushability ‖ρAE−ρA⊗ρE‖1 and
the Holevo information χ = Tr ρAE (log ρAE − log ρA ⊗ ρE)
can be evaluated as
EC2∈C‖ρAE − ρA ⊗ ρE‖1
≤2− 12nE(1−S,pph)+ 32 max{√ε, 1} , (60)
EC2∈C χ
≤ηl
(
2−nE(1−S,pph) max{ε, 1}
)
. (61)
with l = dimC1 − tmin being the length of message.
B. Deterministic universal hash function
In fact, the above argument is valid even for a ε-almost dual
universal2 code pair family. Since our setting is permutation
invariant, a deterministic code pair given in Proposition 3
can be used. That is, given a code C1, we can choose
another t-dimensional subcode C2 such that C⊥1 ⊂ C⊥2 and
ε(C⊥2 /C
⊥
1 ) ≤ n+1. Then by combining (49), (54), and (55),
we see that the security of C1, C2 can be evaluated as
‖ρAE − ρA ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤
√
n+ 1 2−
1
2
nE(1−S, pph)+
3
2 , (62)
χ ≤ηl
(
(n+ 1) 2−nE(1−S,pph)
)
(63)
with the message length l = dimC1 − t. Note that the
construction of code C2 is universal in that it does not
depend on the value of pph. Hence, the linear map defined
by C1 → C1/C2 can be regarded as a type of deterministic
universal hash function which is secure for independent and
identical applications of an arbitrarily given quantum Pauli
channel.
C. Comparison with δ-biased approach
Now, we treat the same setting as the above by using the
δ-biased approach. When the subcode C2 ⊂ C1 is chosen
from an ε-almost dual universal2 subcode family C of a
fixed code C1, we can evaluate the average performance
after the combination of the error correction by C1 and the
privacy amplification by C2 by using Lemma 3 (the δ-biased
approach).
When ε ≥ 1, attaching the smoothing to Lemma 3, Hayashi
[22] derived the following inequalities:
EC2∈C‖ρAE − ρA ⊗ ρE‖1
≤(4 + (n+ 1)1/2√ε)2− 12nE(1−S, pph) (64)
EC2∈Cχ
≤ηn
(
(4 + (n+ 1)1/2
√
ε)2−
1
2
nE(1−S, pph)
)
(65)
EC2∈Cχ
≤2ηu(ε,n)(21−nmax0≤s≤1
s
2−s (S−H1−s(pph))), (66)
where H1−s(p) := 1s log2(p
1−s + (1− p)1−s) and u(ε, n) :=
ε(n+1)
4 log 2 + n. When ε increases at most polynomially, (60) and
(64) give the same exponential evaluation:
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log EC2‖ρAE − ρA ⊗ ρE‖1 ≥
1
2
E(1− S, pph).
(67)
However, for ε ≥ 1,
RHS of (60)
RHS of (64) =
23/2
√
ε
(4 + (n+ 1)1/2
√
ε)
→ 0. (68)
Hence, we can conclude that the evaluation (60) by the phase
error correction approach gives a better evaluation for ‖ρAE−
ρA ⊗ ρE‖1.
In this case, (65) yields the following exponential evaluation
for χ:
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log EC2∈Cχ ≥
1
2
E(1− S, pph), (69)
which is better than that of (66), as is shown in Hayashi [22].
However, the evaluation (61) by the phase error correction
approach gives the following:
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log EC2∈Cχ ≥ E(1− S, pph), (70)
which is twice of the above. Hence, in the case of QKD, we
can conclude that the phase error correction approach is better
than the δ-biased approach based on Lemma 3.
VIII. RELATION WITH EXISTING RESULTS
A. Comparison with existing results
In order to compare our results of this section with existing
ones, we here review the history of the studies of the infor-
mation theoretic security.
Wyner [44], and Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [7] showed the weak
security with the wire-tap channel model in terms of Maurer
and Wolf [30]. Csisza´r [6] showed the strong security with the
same model in terms of Maurer and Wolf [30]. Hayashi [16]
gave the concrete exponential decreasing rate for the strong
security with the same model. These studies use completely
random coding as privacy amplification process. That is, no
linear functions are used in this process. Bennett et al. [3] and
Ha˚stad et al. [15] proposed to use universal2 hash functions
for privacy amplification. Maurer and Wolf [30] applied this
idea to the secret key agreement, which is different setting
form wire-tap channel. They showed the strong security with
universal2 hash functions for privacy amplification. Based
on these ideas, Hayashi [20] showed the strong security
with universal2 hash functions when the sacrifice bit rate is
greater than the mutual information I(A : E). Muramatsu
and Miyake [32] considered a more general condition [33]
than the ε-almost universal2 functions of the code for privacy
amplification. Under this condition, they showed the weak
security However, Watanabe et al. [42] pointed out that their
method cannot derive the strong security based on Hayashi’s
idea [19] in the case of secret key agreement from correlated
source. Further, the impossibility of the strong security under
the condition of ε-almost universal2 will be shown in Theorem
9 by giving a counterexample. Overall, our concept “ε-almost
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universal2” is a larger class of hash function families than any
known classes of linear hash function families guaranteeing
the strong security.
B. ε-almost dual universality2 vs. ε-almost universality2
Finally, as mentioned earlier, we present an example of the
classical wire-tap channel model that can vividly contrast the
properties of the ε-almost dual universality2 and the ε-almost
universality2. Tomamichel et al. showed that when ε converges
to 1, any sequence of ε-almost universal2 subcode families
(of C1 = Fn2 ) guarantees the strong security[40, Lemma 1]4.
However, one sees that, if ε ≥ 2, an ε-almost universal2
subcode family (of C1 = Fn2 ) cannot necessarily guarantee
the strong security. In other words, the choice of the code
C2 from an ε-almost universal2 subcode family of C1 is not
sufficient for the strong security. Note that we have shown
in this section that the ε-almost dual universality2 is indeed
sufficient for this purpose. Hence, at least in the setting of this
section, the ε-almost dual universality2 is the more relevant
criterion for security.
Theorem 9: Assume that the channel from Alice to Bob is
noiseless, and the channel to Eve is binary symmetric with
error probability p. There exists an example of a 2-almost
universal2 code family C for which the hash functions (i.e.,
F
n
2 → Fn2/C2 with C2 ∈ C) cannot guarantee the strong
security.
Proof: Choose an arbitrary universal2 code family C′ =
{C′2 ⊂ Fn−12 }. Then define another code family C in Fn2 ,
consisting of C2 := { x||0 |x ∈ C′2 } with C′2 ∈ C. Here,
a‖b denotes the concatenation of a and b. Hence for any
C2 ∈ C, there exists C′2 ∈ C′, such that C2 consists of
x ∈ C′2 concatenated with a zero. Note that the code family
C is obviously 2-almost universal2, but its dual code family
C⊥ cannot be ε-almost universal2 for any ε < 1, because
x = 0 . . . 01 ∈ C for all C ∈ C⊥.
When Alice transmits a coset [x] ∈ Fn2/C2 as her secret
message, she chooses x ∈ [x] randomly and sends it to Bob.
Due to our construction of C, the n-th bit of x is preserved
in [x] as it is without being canceled by privacy amplification.
Since Eve receives this n-th bit with the error probability p,
Eve’s mutual information regarding [x] is greater than 1−h(p).
Therefore, the strong security does not hold with these hash
functions.
C. Deterministic universal hash function
When there exist errors, one needs error correction as well
as hash functions. Here we denote the code for error correction
by C1 and the code for the hash function by C2. Then, the
relation C2 ⊂ C1 holds. Now, we consider what kind of code
pairs C2 ⊂ C1 yields the strong security.
First note that the phase error correction approach has an
additional advantage over the δ-biased approach; that is, the
phase error correction approach allows us to use an ε-almost
dual universal2 code pair family C2 ⊂ C1.
4Their δ corresponds to ε2m when the bit length of final keys is m.
Note also that the situation is quite different for the δ-biased
approach, because it requires hash functions to be applied after
error correction. That is, one needs to perform an ε-almost
dual universal2 code family to a fixed code space. Hence,
the δ-biased approach can guarantee the strong security only
with an ε-almost dual universal2 subcode family of a fixed
code C1. This relation among classes of code pair families
are summarized in Fig. 2.
In order to illustrate this advantage of the phase error
correction approach with an example, let us take an arbitrary
code C2, and choose a subcode C1 of C2 based on Proposition
3. Then, the permuted code pair family CC2⊂C1 is an (n+1)-
almost dual universal2 code pair family, but is not an (n+1)-
almost dual universal2 subcode family of a fixed code C1.
Hence, as is discussed in Subsection VII-B, for a given
error correction code C1, the phase error correction approach
guarantees the existence of a deterministic hash function that
universally works for an independent and identical setting. In
particular, if the error correcting code C1 universally works
for additive errors given by an independent and identical
distribution, the code pair C2 ⊂ C1 universally works for
error correction as well as privacy amplification.
However, in the δ-biased approach, it is impossible to
construct such a deterministic hash function because this
approach cannot treat the security for an (n+ 1)-almost dual
universal2 code pair family.
Finally, we explain the relation of our results to a univer-
sal quantum CSS code found by Hamada [14] for sending
quantum states. In his paper, he focused on an family of
classical self-dual codes. Then combining qubits based on the
bit basis and qubits based on the phase basis, he succeeded
in constructing a universal quantum CSS code from a set of
universal classical self-dual codes by choosing C⊥1 = C2.
His code can be applied to QKD, where Alice can send
information by using both of the bit basis and the phase
basis. On the other hand, it cannot be applied to our quantum
wire-tap channel model in a straightforward manner, where
only the bit basis is used for sending the classical message.
This is because our method employs two codes C1 and C2
chosen separately. Our method for constructing a deterministic
universal hash function would not work either, if we were to
restrict our codes to self-dual codes. Recall that the key point
of our method is the concept of a “permuted code pair family.”
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have first introduced the concept of “ε-
almost dual universal2 hash function family”. Then, we have
shown that the class of ε-almost dual universal2 hash function
families includes the class of universal2 hash function families.
Employing the relation between quantum error correction
and the security, we have shown that application of ε-almost
dual universal2 hash function family yields the strong security.
We have also mentioned that the results concerning the δ-
biased family [9], [10] imply this fact, while their original
result does not refer the privacy amplification.
We have compared these two approaches, i.e., the phase
error correction approach and the δ-biased approach in the
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Fig. 2. Relation among class of code pairs.
following two points. As the first point, we have shown that the
phase error correction approach yields a better security bound
in terms of the trace distance and the Holevo information,
than the δ-biased approach. As the second point, we have
shown that the phase error correction approach guarantees the
strong security with a larger class of protocols than the δ-
biased approach when we apply error correction as well as
privacy amplification.
In particular, as a byproduct, we have shown the existence
of a universal code for privacy amplification with error correc-
tion. Due to the above difference, the phase error correction
approach can guarantee the existence of such a code, while
the δ-biased approach cannot.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS OF THEOREMS 7 AND 8
First, we show Theorem 7. Due to the linearity, it is
sufficient to evaluate the probability that the received signal
is erroneously decoded to C \ {0} when 0 ∈ C is sent. Let
PnX(x) be the n-independent and identical extension of the
distribution (1 − p, p). Since the phase error x occurs on n-
bits sequence with the probability PnX(x), applying Gallager’s
evaluation[11] to this error probability, for 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ a = 11+s , we obtain
Pe(C) ≤
∑
y∈Fn2
PnX(y)

 ∑
x∈C\{0}
(
PnX(y + x)
PnX(y)
)a
s
=
∑
y∈Fn2
(PnX(y))
1
1+s

 ∑
x∈C\{0}
(PnX(y + x))
1
1+s


s
.
Thus, the error probability P (C) is bounded from above
by this value. Any ε-almost universal2 code family sat-
isfies the inequality EC∈C
∑
x∈C\{0} P
n
X(y + x)
1
1+s ≤
ε2tmax−n
∑
x∈Fn2
PnX(y + x)
1
1+s
. Taking the average concern-
ing the family for C, we obtain the upper bound
EC∈CPe(C)
≤EC∈C
∑
y∈Fn2
PnX(y)
1
1+s

 ∑
x∈C\{0}
PnX(y + x)
1
1+s


s
≤
∑
y∈Fn2
PnX(y)
1
1+s

EC∈C ∑
x∈C\{0}
PnX(y + x)
1
1+s


s
≤
∑
y∈Fn2
PnX(y)
1
1+s

ε2tmax−n ∑
x∈Fn2
PnX(y + x)
1
1+s


s
, (71)
where the concavity of x 7→ xs is used. Since the quantity(
ε2tmax−n
∑
x∈Fn2
PnX(y + x)
1
1+s
)s
does not depend on y,
it can be replaced with
(
ε2tmax−n
∑
x∈Fn2
PnX(x)
1
1+s
)s
=
εs2stmax−sn
(∑
x∈Fn2
PnX(x)
1
1+s
)s
. Hence, the right hand side
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of (71) becomes
∑
y∈Fn2
PnX(y)
1
1+s εs2stmax−sn

∑
x∈Fn2
PnX(x)
1
1+s


s
=εs2stmax−sn

∑
x∈Fn2
PnX(x)
1
1+s


1+s
=εs2stmax−sn2n[s−E0(s,p)]. (72)
From this, we obtain Theorem 7.
Next, we show Theorem 8. Due to the linearity, it is
sufficient to evaluate the probability that the received signal
is erroneously decoded to C1 \ C2 when Alice sends 0 ∈ C2.
The difference from the above case is the derivation of (71).
This part of derivation can be replaced as follows.
EC1∈CPe(C1/C2)
≤ EC1∈C
∑
y∈Fn2
PnX(y)
1
1+s

 ∑
x∈C1\C2
PnX(y + x)
1
1+s


s
≤
∑
y∈Fn2
PnX(y)
1
1+s

EC1∈C ∑
x∈C1\C2
PnX(y + x)
1
1+s


s
≤
∑
y∈Fn2
PnX(y)
1
1+s

ε2tmax−n ∑
x∈Fn2
PnX(y + x)
1
1+s


s
.
Combining this and (72), we obtain (47) and (48). This
discussion can be extended to the case of ε-almost universal2
extended code pair family. Thus, we obtain Theorem 8.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF EQUATION (44)
In order to prove this equation, it is convenient to introduce
another binary distribution Pθ = (pθ, 1 − pθ) that is derived
from P = (p, 1− p), where pθ is defined by
pθ :=
pθ
pθ + (1− p)θ
with the convention that p0 = 0 if p = 0. The distribution
Pθ , parameterized by a real number θ ≥ 0, is often called the
exponential family of P . We also define a function ψ(θ) by
ψ(θ) := log
[
pθ + (1 − p)θ] .
Then the following relations are useful for simplifying calcu-
lations of divergence d(p‖q) and entropy h(p). For θ ≥ 0, we
have
ψ′(θ) = −d(pθ‖p)− h(pθ), ψ′′(θ) ≥ 0,
h(pθ) = −θψ′(θ) + ψ(θ),
dh(pθ)
dθ
= −θψ′′(θ) ≤ 0,
d(pθ‖p) = −ψ(θ)− (1− θ)ψ′(θ),
d(pθ‖p) + h(pθ) = −ψ′(θ).
We shall make frequent use of these formulas in what follows.
Note that E0(s, p) can be rewritten as
E0(s, p) = s− (1 + s)ψ
(
1
1 + s
)
.
First, we prove Equation (44) for the limited case where the
minimum is evaluated over q = pθ with 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.
Lemma 6: If R < 1− h(p),
min
0≤θ≤1
d(pθ‖p) + [1− h(pθ)−R]+ = E(R, p). (73)
Proof: ER(s, p) = −sR+E0(s, p) is convex with respect
to s, since E′′R(s, p) = (1+s)−3ψ′′ (1/(1 + s)) ≥ 0. We define
the critical rate Rc by
Rc := 1− h
(
p1/2
)
,
such that, if R ≤ Rc (resp., R ≥ Rc), then ∂ER∂s
∣∣
s=1
≥ 0
(resp., ∂ER∂s
∣∣
s=1
≤ 0).
Then, if R ≤ Rc, the maximum of ER is attained at s = 1:
E(R, p) = ER(1, p) = −R+ 1− 2ψ(1/2)
= d
(
p1/2
∥∥ p)+ 1− h(p1/2)−R
= min
0≤θ≤1
d (pθ‖ p) + 1− h(pθ)−R.
The last line follows by noting that d(pθ‖p) + 1− h(pθ)−R
attains its minimum at θ = 1/2, since ∂∂θ [d(pθ‖p)− h(pθ)] =
(θ − 1/2)ψ′′(θ) with ψ′′(θ) ≥ 0. Also by noting that 1 −
h(p1/2)−R ≥ 0 for R ≤ Rc, we see that (73) is satisfied for
R ≤ Rc.
On the other hand, if R > Rc, we have ∂ER∂s
∣∣
s=1
≤ 0, and
also ∂ER∂s
∣∣
s=0
> 0 from R < 1− h(p). Thus the maximum is
attained at sR ∈ (0, 1] satisfying ∂ER∂s
∣∣
s=sR
= 0, i.e.,
ψ
(
1
1 + sR
)
− 1
1 + sR
ψ′
(
1
1 + sR
)
= 1−R. (74)
Hence
E(R, p) = ER(sR, p)
=− ψ
(
1
1 + sR
)
− sR
1 + sR
ψ′
(
1
1 + sR
)
=d
(
p(1+sR)−1
∥∥ p) . (75)
Note that the condition (74) can also be written as 1 −
h
(
p(1+sR)−1
)−R = 0. Then by noting that d(pθ‖p)−h(pθ) is
monotonically increasing for 1/2 ≤ θ ≤ 1, whereas d(pθ‖p)
decreasing, we see that the minimum of (73) is attained for
θ = (1 + sR)
−1
. Hence (73) holds for R > Rc as well.
Proof of Equation (44): Let
M1 := min
0≤q≤1
d(q‖p) + [1− h(q)−R]+,
M2 := min
0≤θ≤1
d(pθ‖p) + [1− h(pθ)−R]+.
Then from Lemma 6, it suffices to show M1 = M2. Since
M1 ≤M2 holds trivially, it remains to show M1 ≥M2.
Denote the value of q attaining the minimum of M1 by q˜.
Then we have
d(q˜‖p) ≤ d(p0‖p) (76)
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since otherwise,
M1 > d(p0‖p) + [1− h(q˜)−R]+
≥ d(p0‖p) + [1− h(p0)−R]+ ≥M2, (77)
which contradicts M1 ≤M2. The second line of (77) follows
by noting that h(q˜) ≤ h(p0) with p0 being the uniform
distribution. Note that this is true even when p = 0 (resp.
p = 1) because then q˜ = 0 (resp. q˜ = 1) due to the condition
d(q˜‖p) <∞.
By a straightforward calculation, one can show that, given
an arbitrary combination of p, q, θ satisfying d(q‖p) =
d(pθ‖p),
h(pθ)− h(q) = d(q‖pθ)
1− θ (78)
holds.From (76), d(q˜‖p) = d(pθ˜‖p) holds for some θ˜ ∈ [0, 1].
Then by using (78), we see that h(pθ˜) ≥ h(q˜), and thus M1 ≥
M2.
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